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COnGressiOnAL PrOCess And PubLiC 
OPiniOn tOwArd COnGress:  
An eXPeriMentAL AnALysis usinG  
the C-sPAn videO LibrAry
Jonathan S. Morris and Michael W. Joy
Congress is consistently the least popular branch of government. Nearly a half century ago Ralph Nader called Congress “the broken branch,” 
and that perception has held firm among the public and the media. Even 
individual members of Congress take care to distance themselves from the 
chronically disliked institution by running against the Congress. Scholars 
have examined a number of factors that have been linked to low mass ap-
proval of Congress, including negative reactions to congressional policies 
(Davidson & Parker, 1972; Fenno, 1975; Parker, 1981; Ramirez, 2013), the 
state of the president’s popularity (Patterson & Caldeira, 1990), and public 
perceptions of the current state of the economy (Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht, 
1997; Ramirez, 2013). 
Research has also tied low public approval of Congress to the inability 
of the membership to live up to the public’s overall expectations (Kimball 
& Patterson, 1997) and the institution’s tendency to engage in largely 
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unpopular—although democratic—political processes, such as extensive 
debate, excessive partisanship, conflict, and compromise (Binder, 2003, 2015; 
Doherty, 2015; Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 
1995, 2002; Mann & Ornstein, 2006, 2012; Ramirez, 2009; Sinclair, 2011). 
Also, recent computerized sentiment analysis has linked the decline of proso-
cial language on the floor to the erosion of congressional approval over time 
(Frimer, Aquino, Gerbauer, Zhu, & Oakes, 2015).
Outside the arena of policy and process, researchers have pointed at 
congressional scandals, involving one or more members of Congress, as a 
major factor in damaging the institution’s reputation (Bowler & Karp, 2004; 
McDermott, Schwartz, & Valleho, 2015; Rozell, 1994; Sabato, Stencel, & 
Lichter, 2000).
The televised images of Congress in the media are of particular impor-
tance in understanding opinion regarding the institution’s actions and be-
havior. While some Americans have experience dealing with their own con-
gressional representatives (see Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Fenno, 1978; 
Mayhew, 1974), their impressions of the performance of the membership as 
a whole as well as the institution are grounded primarily in what they have 
seen on television (Arnold, 2004).
Since 1979, the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) has pro-
vided gavel-to-gavel coverage of floor proceedings as well as coverage of con-
gressional committee hearings and press events on television. The C-SPAN 
Video Library has captured all of this coverage and made it available for pub-
lic use. The archive, along with its sophisticated online cataloging and index-
ing system, provides an unprecedented view into the institution of Congress 
(Browning, 2014; Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996). From a research perspective, 
C-SPAN’s 30 years of archived congressional proceedings constitutes the most 
complete and publicly accessible accounting of government activity to date. 
While these data have been used to examine congressional activity and public 
opinion toward the institution (Morris, 2001; Morris & Witting, 2001), there 
is still much knowledge that can be gained from the valuable resources pro-
vided by the C-SPAN Video Library.
The intent of this project is to use the valuable resource of the C-SPAN 
Video Library to improve our understanding of how Americans react to 
Congress on television. Using the C-SPAN Video Library, we construct an 
experimental analysis that examines how subjects respond to congressional 
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floor process in the House and Senate. The valuable search and editing tools 
provided by the C-SPAN Video Library provide a unique opportunity to in-
vestigate Congress experimentally—an approach which is seldom employed 
in congressional research. 
Overall, our study is an exploration into the public’s reaction to floor 
activity. Our exploration is grounded in the notion that not all floor activity 
is the same. Specifically, we focus on two different aspects of the legislative 
process on the floor: partisanship and legislative maneuvering. Our findings 
show that subjects react negatively to both types of processes, but the degree 
of these reactions differs. We discuss our findings in the context of how con-
gressional actors can influence how the institution is perceived by the masses.
the LeGisLAtive PrOCess And PubLiC OPiniOn tOwArd COnGress
Unlike the presidency, the courts, and even nongovernmental institutions 
where the deliberative process takes place largely away from public view, the 
U.S. Congress and its proceedings are relatively wide-open for public display. 
On any given day on Capitol Hill, committee hearings are open to the public, 
hours of floor debate are captured on C-SPAN, and dozens of press confer-
ences are held. All of these events work to make the congressional process a 
virtual open book.
From a public-opinion standpoint, however, this openness has conse-
quences. Past research has claimed that the average American does not respond 
positively to the sight of gridlock, legislative red tape, or seemingly endless 
political debate (Binder, 2003, 2015; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). On the 
contrary, many Americans often take delight at the thought of benevolent po-
litical leaders who take quick, decisive action for the public good (Altemeyer, 
1988; Adorno, 1950; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Congress, however, was 
designed precisely to thwart such action. Thus, when Congress performs its 
constitutional role of meticulously debating political issues and events, the 
American public tends to respond negatively (Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht, 
1997). The institution was designed to promote extensive deliberation and fac-
tional conflict. This design makes Congress the most democratic institution in 
the national government. The research has found that Americans love the idea 
of democracy in theory, but do not like to see the process play out in action. 
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In short, the public has a lack of appreciation for the legislature’s highly delib-
erative role in the American democratic process. Instead, Americans would 
prefer a stealth democracy where the political process is accessible yet hidden 
from the public’s sight and left to trustworthy leaders (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 
2002). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) sum up this popular perception:
[Americans] dislike compromise and bargaining, they dislike com-
mittees and bureaucracy, they dislike political parties and interest 
groups, they dislike big salaries and big staffs, they dislike slowness 
and multiple stages, and they dislike debate and publicly hashing 
things out, referring to such actions as haggling or bickering. (18)
The degree to which the masses respond negatively to process has been 
debated. Many scholars argue that policy outcomes are the primary indicator 
of views toward Congress (Easton, 1965; Jones, 2013; Jones & McDermott, 
2009; Wlezien & Carman, 2001). For instance, a recent study by Harbridge 
and Malhotra (2011) finds that public disdain for a bipartisan process is out-
weighed by individual-level partisan policy preferences. This reflects the larger 
notion that elite behavior does not have much influence on the views of the 
mass public (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2005).
On the other side of the argument, researchers contend that public re-
actions to legislative process can actually supersede the policy issues and the 
outcomes (Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). 
Ramirez (2009) concluded that the public’s desire to mitigate procedural par-
tisan conflict among legislators is more important than the substance of policy 
actions. Harbridge and Malhotra (2011) find partisan conflict reduces public 
support for Congress, but also note that the partisan public responds favor-
ably to their own representatives who act in a partisan manner.
Regardless of the degree to which public disdain for legislative process 
plays a role in shaping mass opinion of Congress, the evidence supports the 
notion that it is significant. However, what exactly is the legislative process, 
and how is it measured? While the definitions of the legislative process var-
ies slightly, almost all contain the same core concepts. These concepts include 
open disagreement of competing interests, compromise, inefficiency, and 
some degree of adherence to procedural norms (Crick, 1992; Durr, Gilmour, 
& Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; Ramirez, 2009). 
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There is, however, a shortcoming in the current understanding of how 
legislative process is conceptualized and measured. Specifically, the existing 
studies have not fully examined the notion that legislative process on the 
floor of Congress can vary dramatically. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 
2002) relied primarily on focus groups and cross-sectional survey data to 
show a general disdain for the process-related issues that are commonplace 
in Congress. Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) used time-series analysis 
to show that mass support for Congress tends to drop when major legisla-
tion is under consideration on Capitol Hill. Their measurement of process, 
however, was dependent on the number of major bills under consideration 
in Congress, as well as the number of presidential vetoes and subsequent veto 
overrides. The assumption was that process issues are visible to the American 
public during times of action on major legislation. When there is no major 
legislation under consideration, the assumption was that process issues are 
off the American public’s radar screen. Ramirez (2009) relied strictly on the 
number of partisan-oriented votes in Congress to determine the visibility of 
process to the masses.
However, the legislative process in not monolithic, and thus should not 
be conceptualized or measured as such. Legislative conflict on the floor is not 
the same as the procedural wrangling that is discussion of committee hear-
ings, markups, and amendments. Who is to say the public’s response would 
be uniform? The most significant shortcoming of earlier studies on public re-
actions to process is that the nature of the legislative process had been some-
what oversimplified. Likewise, generalizations regarding the public’s reaction 
to process may have been oversimplified as well. A more detailed examination 
of the specific elements of legislative process in Congress may provide greater 
understanding of how the American public reacts. Because the research into 
this topic has mostly examined aggregate opinion of the legislative process, 
we lack more detailed analysis at the individual level.
We thus propose to examine two unique aspects of the legislative pro-
cess on the floor of the United States Congress: conflict between parties and 
legislative maneuvering. While it is clear that conventional wisdom sug-
gests both of these process elements prompt negative responses from the 
public, they deserve to be examined separately. Likewise, a comparison is 
warranted. While conflict and legislative maneuvering have been conflated, 
some content-analysis research suggests that the media cover these process 
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elements differently (Morris & Clawson, 2005). Specifically, legislative ma-
neuvering is more prevalent in mainstream media coverage (70%) than par-
tisan conflict (33%, categories not mutually exclusive). These elements cer-
tainly overlap with frequency, but they are often presented to the masses in 
different contexts.
Based on the preceding discussion, our intent is to explore the effect of 
exposure to congressional partisan conflict as well the effect of exposure to 
legislative maneuvering. We will investigate how individuals respond to these 
process elements singularly, and we will examine responses to both elements 
simultaneously. In the section below, we discuss how we collected samples of 
congressional partisan conflict and legislative maneuvering from C-SPAN. 
We will then discuss how these samples were used in a controlled online ex-
periment.
CAPturinG PArtisAn COnFLiCt And LeGisLAtive MAneuverinG On C-sPAn
The public availability of video from the C-SPAN Video Library allows the 
ability to search through congressional floor debate. The indexing tool within 
each day of coverage allows the ability to search for specific types of floor ac-
tion, including amendments, motions, and references to committee reports. 
The same tool also allows the ability to locate usage of unconstrained floor 
time, which includes one-minute speeches, five-minute speeches, and special 
orders. Using these tools, we were able to locate an array of floor behavior that 
exemplified both partisan conflict and legislative maneuvering. The C-SPAN 
Video Library clipping feature also allows selected video to be captured and 
downloaded for editing. This gave us the opportunity to peruse a wide array of 
coverage that typifies both partisan conflict and legislative maneuvering. The 
sophistication of these online search and editing tools provides researchers 
a unique ability to acquire footage of the congressional institution in many 
forms. Certainly, this is ideal for experimental analysis of Congress—an area 
of research that borders on nonexistent.
From these scores of selected clips, we first settled on six partisan speeches 
from unconstrained floor time in the U.S. House of Representatives—three 
from the Republicans and three from the Democrats. These speeches con-
stituted the conflict element of legislative process. Combined, these clips 
congressional Process and Public Opinion toward congress 7
were 6 minutes and 34 seconds long. In order to control for variations in the 
demographics of the speakers, we chose to use only clips of White males. 
Additionally, we chose speeches delivered from the well of the House floor, 
thus allowing for similar camera angles. Finally, we controlled for substance 
by including speeches that only spoke of pending budget legislation offered 
by the House Republicans and Democrats. Below is a transcript of a sample 
partisan conflict video:
Mr. Speaker, today Americans are working more and earning less. The 
cost of college is rising, young people are in debt and America’s infra-
structure is in decay. Mr. Speaker, the Republican budget does noth-
ing to help struggling Americans, it gives tax breaks to the wealthy, 
ends the Medicare guarantee, makes it harder for Americans to buy 
a home, and cuts funding for education. Our military leaders even 
testified that the Republican budget will put the lives of our men 
and woman in uniform at risk. Mr. Speaker, this is outrageous, the 
American people elected us, we owe them to pass a budget that ad-
dresses their needs, keeps them safe, and gives them the best oppor-
tunity possible to live the American dream. Let’s focus on creating 
good-paying jobs, providing universal pre-K, and restoring food 
stamps programs that have helped many American families through 
these tough times, and let’s ensure that our military has the resources 
they need to make sure they can fight the fight that America wants. 
Democrats will keep standing with the American people and do the 
job they were elected to do on behalf of the American people.
Second, we selected three separate clips of members of Congress discuss-
ing legislative maneuvering. These clips made little reference to substantive 
policy issues. Instead, these were discussions from both the House and Senate 
floor that were procedural in nature. There was no mention of partisanship, 
either. The only evidence of partisanship was in the “R” or “D” attached to the 
name of the speaker on the bottom of the screen. Similarly, policy was only 
mentioned in the title of the bills and reports discussed. As was the case with 
the partisan-conflict video, this video contained only White male speakers. 
In total, the video was 5 minutes and 18 seconds in length. See the follow-
ing excerpt:
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Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only I yield the customary 
thirty minutes to the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Slaughter.  
I yield myself such time as I may consume, and ask unanimous con-
sent to revise and extend my remarks and insert extraneous mate-
rial in the record.
Speaker: Without objection, so ordered.
During consideration of the resolution, all time is yielded for 
the purpose of debate only. Last night the Rules Committee met 
and granted a modified closed rule for H.R. 10, the Comprehensive 
Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act of 2001. The rule pro-
vides for ninety minutes of general debate, with sixty minutes equally 
divided and controlled by the chairman and the ranking member 
of the Committee on Ways and Means, and thirty minutes equally 
divided and controlled by the Chairman and Ranking Member of 
the Committee on Education and the Work Force. Additionally, the 
rule waives all points of order against consideration of the bill, and 
against consideration of the amendment printed in the report. The 
rule provides that in lieu of the amendments recommended by the 
Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Education 
of the Work Force, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
printed in the Congressional Record and numbered one shall be con-
sidered as adopted. The rule also provides for consideration of the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the rules com-
mittee report. If offered by Representative Rangel or his designee, 
which shall be considered as read and separately debatable for one 
hour equally divided and controlled by a proponent and an oppo-
nent. Finally the rule provides for one motion to recommit with or 
without instructions.
A third video was constructed as an abbreviated compilation of the pre-
ceding videos. This contained four of the six partisan videos (two Democrats, 
two Republicans) and half of the process-element videos. This clip was 8 min-
utes long. Each of the three videos can be viewed as edited at the following web 
locations: http://www.politicalresearchlab.org/clip1.html; http://www.political 
researchlab.org/clip2.html; and http://www.politicalresearchlab.org/clip3.html
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reseArCh desiGn And MethOds
We used the three videos discussed above to create posttest-only control group 
experimental analysis, in which subjects watched a video and took a brief on-
line posttest questionnaire. Condition One was partisan conflict, Condition 
Two was legislative maneuvering, and Condition Three was a combination 
of partisanship and maneuvering. The fourth condition is a control group.
Subjects were recruited into the experimental pool via Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk, which allows requesters (in this case the researchers) to 
hire workers (in this case the subjects) to complete short tasks, typically for 
minimal fees. This service has become popular among experimental social 
scientists for the purpose of subject recruitment beyond the typical usage of 
voluntary student subjects. While this subject pool lacks the generalizability 
of randomly selected participants, research has suggested that Mechanical 
Turk’s samples “will often be more diverse than [other] convenience samples 
and will always be more diverse than student samples” (Berinsky, Huber, & 
Lenz, 2012, p. 361; see also Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). 
Our subjects were paid $0.50 each for participation in the experiment, 
and randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. To control for validity, 
subjects were only permitted to participate a single time in a single condition. 
Additionally, in order to ensure that subjects assigned to Conditions One 
through Three actually did experience the experimental stimuli (the video 
in full), we included two filter questions on the posttest questionnaire. The 
first question asked, “Where was the video you just watched taking place?” 
Response options included a sporting event, a music concert, Congress, or a 
farm equipment convention. Subjects who answered incorrectly were excluded 
from participation. The second filter question was tied to the content of the 
videos. Specifically, the last few seconds of the video showed a screen shot that 
said, “Remember this number: 12.” In the survey, subjects were asked, “Which 
number was shown at the end of the video you just watched?” Subjects who 
answered incorrectly had the option to go back and watch the video again, and 
were allowed to continue if they got the question correct on the next chance. In 
order to prevent subjects from skipping to the end of each video, the videos were 
posted using technology that prevented subjects from simply skipping to the 
end and observing the number. In short, we did all we could in order to make 
certain the subjects did indeed watch the videos they were assigned to watch.
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The primary independent variable was the experimental condition to 
which the subjects were exposed. Additional independent variables were 
collected from the posttest survey as well. These variables included age, race, 
gender, education, income, and partisan identification. See the Appendix to 
this chapter for measurement details.
Multiple dependent variables were collected as well. The first was a gen-
eral question that assessed the subjects’ perception of Congress as a whole: 
“On a scale of 1–10, how do you feel about the U.S. Congress? The higher the 
number, the more favorably you feel toward the U.S. Congress. The lower the 
number, the less favorably you feel toward the U.S. Congress. An answer of 
5 would indicate you feel neither favorably nor unfavorably toward the U.S. 
Congress. Click the number that best corresponds to your feelings.” The sec-
ond set of dependent variables was collected by asking respondents to agree 
or disagree with a number of statements about Congress, congressional par-
ties, and the ability of the parties and factions in Congress to work together 
(1 = strongly disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 
4 = somewhat agree; 5 = strongly agree). These statements are listed in the 
Appendix to this chapter. In the following section, we outline the findings 
from our experiment and discuss the results.
FindinGs
Table 1.1 displays a set of ordinary least squares regressions in which the 
dependent variables are thermometer scores toward Congress, President 
Obama, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party (1 to 10 scale). These 
models were run only on the control group, and use the following basic pre-
dictors of approval: party identification, gender, education, income, ideology, 
race and age. Unlike feelings toward the president, the Democrats, and the 
Republicans, it is clear that feelings toward Congress are much less predictable. 
None of the standard predictors are statistically significant, not even partisan 
identification or ideology—even though Republicans control both chambers. 
The low adjusted R-squared (.07) compared to the others illustrates this point.
In order to examine the effect of the experimental stimuli on feelings to-
ward Congress, variables for Condition 1, 2, and 3 were added into the model 
for Congress. Each condition was generated as a dummy variable in which 1 = 
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Party ID -.22 (.17) -.83 (.17)** -.98 (.16)** .57 (.15)**
Male -1.14 (.33)** -.15 (.33) -.73 (.31)* -.57 (.29)
Education .07 (.14) .06 (.14) -.09 (.13) .12 (.13)
Income .08 (.07) .22 (.07)** .16 (.07)* .04 (.06)
Conservative/Liberal -.44 (.26) .72 (.25)** .29 (.24) -.79 (.22)**
White .10 (.47) -.71 (.46) .35 (.43) .08 (.41)
Age -.02 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.03 (.01)
Constant 6.67 (1.59)** 5.60 (1.56)** 7.73 (1.46)** 4.60 (1.39)**
N 172 172 172 172
Adj. R-Squared .07 .53 .51 .48
Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
table 1.2 Thermometer Scores Toward Congress by Experimental Condition














Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
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exposure to that condition and 0 = no exposure to that condition. The control 
condition is the excluded category in the regression. Table 1.2 displays the re-
sults. These results show conclusively that neither exposure to partisan conflict 
nor legislative maneuvering significantly influenced the dependent variable of 
feelings toward Congress. Table 1.3 confirms these null results in an ordered 
logistic regression model in which overall approval for Congress was the de-
pendent variable (1 = strongly disapprove; 2 = somewhat disapprove; 3 = nei-
ther approve nor disapprove; 4 = somewhat approve; 5 = strongly approve).



















Note: Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors 
in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
What about perceptions of the ability of congressional factions to work 
together in Washington? Did the experimental stimuli have an influence? 
We address this question by asking respondents in the posttest to disagree or 
agree with the following statements: (1) “I believe that the liberals and con-
servatives in Congress can put aside their differences to do what is best for 
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America,” (2) “The liberals in Congress don’t seem willing to work with the 
conservatives,” and (3) “The conservatives in Congress don’t seem willing to 
work with liberals” (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = neither 
agree nor disagree; 4 = somewhat agree; 5 = strongly agree). These items were 
regressed against exposure to experimental condition and the control vari-
ables in an ordered logit analysis. The results are presented in Table 1.4. As it 
can be seen, the experimental stimuli did not significantly influence percep-
tions of the two sides of Congress to work together.
table 1.4 Perceptions of Cooperation and Government














to work with 
liberals
Conflict .04(.19) -.08(.20) .02(.20)
Legislative Maneuvering .24(.20) .08(.20) -.09(.21)
Both .17(.20) -.21(.20) -.11(.21)
Knowledge -.08(.05) .02(.04) .16(.05)**
Party ID -.06(.07) .30(.07)** -.06(.08)
Male -.41(.14)** -.14(.15) -.05(.15)
Education -.08(.06) -.06(.07) .00(.07)
Income .02(.03) -.02(.04) .03(.04)
Conservative/Liberal -.01(.11) -.62(.12)** .45(.12)**
White -.45(.18)* .22(.18) .60(.19)**
Age .01(.01) .00(.01) .00(.01)
N 694 694 694
Constant 1 -2.59 -3.96 -1.38
Constant 2 -1.28 -2.48 .21
Constant 3 -.56 -1.68 1.25
Constant 4 .85 .00 2.77
Chi-Squared 29.18** 235.12** 81.49**
Log Likelihood -1,080.45 -952.58 -854.84
Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 
(two-tailed)
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Overall, the results from the first set of analyses reported in Tables 1.1 
through 1.4 indicate that exposure to congressional partisan conflict and leg-
islative maneuvering do not significantly impact perceptions of Congress as 
a whole or the perception of the ability of the membership to work together. 
But were there other reactions that shed light on the differential reactions to 
congressional partisanship versus legislative maneuvering? The findings from 
Table 1.5 demonstrate how exposure to the experimental stimuli influenced 
individuals’ perception of their own understanding of politics and govern-
ment, also referred to as internal political efficacy (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 
1991). The results clearly show that partisan conflict has no effect on inter-
nal efficacy, but the legislative-maneuvering condition has a significant neg-
ative impact. That is, individuals who witnessed legislative maneuvering were 
much more likely to agree that “sometimes politics and government seem so 
complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s happening.” 
Also, the combination of legislative maneuvering and partisan conflict has 
the same effect, but to a lesser extent.
While internal political efficacy is an individual’s perception of the indi-
vidual’s ability to comprehend politics, external political efficacy is the per-
ception of how political figures react to them (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990). 
In other words, how responsive does an individual feel governmental figures 
are to the individual’s own wishes? In order to measure this concept, we in-
cluded two items in the posttest that asked subjects to agree or disagree with 
statements about members of Congress. The first statement read, “I don’t 
think members of Congress care much what people like me think,” and the 
second read, “People like me don’t have any say about what Congress does” 
(1 = strongly disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = neither agree nor dis-
agree; 4 = somewhat agree; and 5 = strongly agree). We combined these two 
responses to create an additive index ranging from 2 to 10. Due to the nature 
of the measurement, higher values reflected lower levels of external efficacy 
toward Congress. For ease of interpretation, we reversed the coding so that 
2 = lowest external efficacy and 10 = highest external efficacy.
Table 1.6 illustrates the effect of our experimental stimuli on external effi-
cacy toward Congress. If we relax our expectation of statistical significance to 
p ≤ .10, it can be seen that there appears to be a positive effect when it comes 
to exposure to partisan conflict and the combination of partisan conflict and 
legislative maneuvering. In other words, individuals who witnessed partisan 
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conflict were less cynical about the responsiveness of Congress than those 
in the control group. The legislative-maneuvering condition, however, failed 
to reach statistical significance, again illustrating a differential impact across 
different elements of legislative process.
Were there other differential emotional responses to the experimental stim-
uli? The findings from Table 1.7 strongly suggest that there is a significant differ-
ence. Each participant in Conditions 1 through 3 was asked to report how the 
videos of Congress made them feel. The response options were (a) interested, 
(b) uninterested, (c) frustrated, (d) angry, (e) happy, and (f) none of the above. 
Subjects were permitted to click as many feelings that applied. Table 1.7 shows 
the effects of the partisan conflict on emotions relative to legislative maneuvering, 
table 1.5 Internal Political Efficacy
variable
Agree that Politics and Government seem Complicated 



















Note: Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
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table 1.6 External Political Efficacy
variable
external efficacy















Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients 
with standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
table 1.7 Emotional Responses to Clips (Partisan-Conflict and Legislative-Maneuvering Groups Only)
variable interested uninterested Frustrated Angry
Conflict 1.14(.26)** -2.14(.28)** 1.41(.25)** 1.45(.37)**
Party ID -.22(.14) .50(.14)** -.04(.13) -.10(.18)
Male .23(.25) -.25(.26) -.29(.24) .83(.33)*
Education -.04(.11) .04(.11) .16(.11) .06(.15)
Income -.10(.06) .01(.07) .02(.06) -.05(.08)
Conservative/Liberal -.05(.21) .45(.22)* .07(.19) .14(.14)
White -.45(.30) .11(.33) .43(.31) .42(.42)
Age -.00(.01) -.05(.01) .03(.01) -.00(.01)
Constant .57(1.42) -.94(1.46) -3.46(1.34)** -3.64(1.89)
N 349 349 349 349
Chi-Squared 39.40** 99.36** 46.23** 33.61**
Log Likelihood -199.32 -187.55 -215.88 -131.84
Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
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which is the excluded category. The combination condition and the control group 
were dropped from this analysis. Note that “happy” and “none of the above” are 
not included due to the extreme rarity of that response (only three respondents 
reported feeling happy or none of the above). They demonstrate starkly different 
emotional reactions. In short, partisan conflict drew much more interest from 
the subjects than legislative maneuvering. At the same time, partisan conflict 
was significantly more likely to arouse frustration and anger among viewers. 
COnCLusiOn
Our study contributes to the current understanding of public responses to 
Congress by exploring reactions to unique elements of the legislative process 
on the floor. Although perceptions of Congress as a whole are fairly stable in 
the face of exposure to congressional partisan conflict and legislative maneu-
vering on the floor of Congress, we discovered unique emotional responses. 
While it is not generally thought that exposure to Congress in action on 
C-SPAN would provoke emotion among viewers, our results suggest other-
wise. Legislative maneuvering is associated with decreased external efficacy, 
but not internal efficacy. Exposure to partisan conflict, on the other hand, 
generates more interest among viewers and is tied to higher levels of exter-
nal efficacy toward Congress. This is a compelling result in the context of our 
findings that exposure to the partisan-conflict condition of our experiment is 
also associated with much higher levels of anger and frustration.
The idea that exposure to partisanship on the House floor is tied to more 
positive views toward any aspect of Congress is in contrast to conventional 
wisdom on the topic (Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-
Morse, 1995; Ramirez, 2009). Why may this be the case? Perhaps the public 
is not entirely sure what it wants from government (Ladd, 1983, 1990). This, 
Everett Ladd argues, sets the stage for a “cognitive Madisonianism” among 
the masses, where conflict between tenacious actors with divergent views on 
the role of government is welcomed (1990). Individually, most Americans 
would decry the perils of a Congress mired in gridlock, but the public as a 
whole may have a more accommodating view on the matter. David Mayhew 
(1996) follows this logic and cautiously proposes the notion that Americans 
as a collective find partisan tension at the federal level comforting.
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From this perspective, policy outcomes may not be as important to the 
public as the image that congressional actors are fulfilling their representative 
function by engaging in conflict. When conflict is less apparent to the public, 
larger stereotypes of a do-nothing Congress are more likely to take hold on 
the masses. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001) note, “People want decision 
making to be a balance between elected officials and ordinary people, but they 
think they are getting a process dominated by officeholders” (p. 152). In other 
words, a Congress devoid of conflict is a Congress in collusion with itself and 
the special interests. While it is unconventional to suggest that Congress may 
improve its image by conducting more vigorous partisan debate over the is-
sues, our exploration warrants further study. We urge future researchers to 
at least take this possibility under consideration. 
Furthermore, we wish to encourage greater usage of the C-SPAN Video 
Library as a resource. Experimental research is the key to gaining a more nu-
anced understanding of how the public feels about the United States Congress. 
The vast majority of work on public opinion toward Congress has relied on sur-
vey data. If we wish to understand the affective responses individuals have to 
Congress, further experimental studies should be employed. The C-SPAN Video 
Library is the most valuable resource available to researchers in this regard.
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